Europe is in danger of losing its leading position in nuclear power, warns Claude Fischer Herzog, Director of ASCPE-Les Entretiens Européens et Eurafricains, a prominent Paris-based pro-nuclear civil society organisation. Fischer calls on the EU to develop an industrial policy of which nuclear power will form an integral part.
What are the strongest policy signals at EU level for the future of nuclear in Europe?
The Euratom Treaty has made Europe a major industrial power thanks to nuclear technology. However, 60 years later, nuclear power is absent from the Energy Union, which is not a good political signal! To maintain its leading position, European industry needs an industrial sector policy. However, the market discourages long-term investment, competition policy prohibits – except on a case-by-case basis – long-term contracts considered as State aid. Although the Commission has given a positive signal by accepting the Contract for Difference (CfD) in the United Kingdom [for the Hinkley Point C nuclear power project, ed.], it is insufficient because nuclear power is excluded from the question of the energy mix, which is not properly centered at the level of the Union on the basis of growth, competitiveness and CO2 reduction.
What are the main issues in the Clean Energy Package [the European Commission’s set of legislative proposals for the future EU energy market] for nuclear?
Since 2008, the Commission has favoured renewable energies to the detriment of nuclear energy, which does not emit greenhouse gases. This “positive discrimination” has had many perverse effects on safety and competitiveness, leading to a renationalisation of energy policies and fragmentation of the market. The 2016 Winter Package [i.e. Clean Energy Package] offers more solidarity on the market, adapting it with new rules and better price signals to reach 50% of renewables in 2050. Will these rules apply to nuclear power? The Community’s nuclear indicative program PINC [Nuclear Illustrative Program, a position paper on nuclear power published irregularly by the European Commission, ed.] focuses solely on investments for safety, decommissioning of plants and waste management. But if safety becomes a dimension of nuclear competitiveness in Europe, it will be counterproductive! There must be both security and competitiveness policy.
What is the state of the European nuclear industry? What is needed to strengthen the industry?
With 131 reactors and the largest nuclear fleet in the world, Europe has considerable European know-how that must be valued, especially since it will need 120 gigawatts (GW) of new generation capacity 2024 and will have to replace or renovate 150 GW of power plants (mostly nuclear and coal). This is a considerable challenge for all the Member States which will have to invest heavily in their own energy. However, the share of nuclear power declined from 32% in 2002 to 26.7% in the European electricity mix. Given the competitiveness of nuclear power, several European states are extending the life of the power stations, others are building new ones, and a dozen are planned. For these projects to be realized, the European Union must go beyond supporting the Astrid pilot project [a sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor] and the ITER [nuclear fusion] program! It must put in place a sector policy that focuses on long-term investments and their financing and fostering partnerships between financial and industrial investors.
Is new build the most promising direction for future growth? In Europe, or globally?
Countries such as China and India, which are facing a sharp rise in population, have realized that they will not complete their energy consumption balance and their CO2 commitments without nuclear power. If we want to meet global energy demand and contain global warming at 2°C, we will have to deploy 930 GW of nuclear capacity and increase capacity by 530 GW by 2050. A disengagement from Europe at the very moment we enter a new nuclear age would be an enormous handicap for the sector and its export strengths, but also for safety, which is a global public good.
What are the prospects for European industry growth in areas such as decommissioning, waste management, waste conditioning etc.?
The challenge is all the greater in that it will be necessary to renovate, close or replace 200 reactors (out of 434). Dismantling is a long and expensive process that will require an efficient industry, adapted skills, long-term financing, a regulated market with clear regulations and authorization processes, controlled nuclear waste management, and a lot of solidarity and transparency. It is a task for the coming decades that requires action and commitment – and not leaving it to future generations. A formidable question for Europe: will dismantling be a factor of integration or, on the contrary, a worsening of tensions between operators and states within Europe?
How does economic pressure on operators affect safety standards at nuclear power stations?
I would like to return the question and examine the maintenance and operating costs of the nuclear reactors that have to meet the electricity consumption and nuclear safety standards that have been tightened after the Fukushima disaster. In France, the costs of the “grand carénage“ [national refit programme after Fukushima, ed.] are estimated at €100 billion for the 58 reactors. With the volume of electricity produced and sold constant, nuclear power production costs are expected to rise, with provisions for dismantling, from €49.60/MWh to €62.60/MWh. If the share of nuclear power is reduced in the mix, safety costs will be increased but these costs could be amortized if the sector is regenerated and if the costs of exporting are shared.
How will Brexatom affect Europe’s nuclear industry?
With the departure of the United Kingdom from Euratom, the nuclear states lose a powerful ally against Germany, which is working to ensure that all Euratom funds are directed towards dismantling programs rather than production and research. We may also wonder about the future of JET (Joint European Torus) that Euratom finances 50% or the construction of ITER with a budget of €18 billion. But of course, we mainly think of the French industry, committed to the construction of two EPRs [reactors] at Hinkley Point, a €21 billion project that is scheduled to start in 2019 and eventually provide 7% of the UK’s electricity.
Editor’s Note
Claude Fischer Herzog is Director of ASCPE-Les Entretiens Européens & Eurafricains, a Paris-based organisation decdicated to promoting nuclear power in Europe. Les Entretiens Européens [European debates] will host a high-level summit on “the issues of nuclear competitiveness in Europe” on 19 October in Brussels.
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Hans says
Shouldn’t the title be: “the nuclear industry needs a EU nuclear industry policy”?
Helmut Frik says
” especially since it will need 120 gigawatts (GW) of new generation capacity 2024 and will have to replace or renovate 150 GW of power plants (mostly nuclear and coal). ”
Why?
Why should anyone want to replace old thermal capacity with overly expensive new thermal capacity? Even the existing thermal power plants can’t pay their bills under competition. Which tells there are too many f them, and there are cheaper alternatives today. So why should anyone want to do this?
As long as this question is unanswered, ans remains a assumption on which the whole article is being built.
So far, with no clear answer to this question, it could be enough to send a team of historicans around to safe the existing knowledge and documentations for future generations, in case ithey are needed once again sometimes in the future.
Nigel West says
Finland should have been mentioned. OL3 is almost finished and TVO is now planning OL4. Their Hanhikivi project with Rosatom is also underway. Poland is considering working with the Chinese firm CGN to build Hualong reactors, also planned for the UK. Sweden is planning new reactors too.
Civil nuclear power certainly needs supportive Government policies. EU support would also help. Germany made a political decision to abandon nuclear and that ideology should not unduly influence EU policy.
Industrial policy, whatever that may mean, might be key to France, but not so elsewhere. Commercial arrangements, cost and schedule are key issues in the UK, not promoting ‘national champions’.
Jan Veselý says
Well, Polish nuclear “plans” are just a “hot air”. Swedish nuclear “plans” are nonexistent. In fact, Swedish are heading to the goal of 100% RE in 2040. They only announced that if there will be some investors who will want to build new nuclear reactors in the place of current ones, the government will neither block them nor support them.
You should also add my home Czechia where politicians “know” the country needs new nukes but they have absolutely no idea how to finance it and how to make it economically sensible.
Meanwhile wind a solar auctions are breaking cost records in the fast pace while European companies in that business thrive and expand abroad.
Helmut Frik says
Looks like th planned reactor Hanhikivi will be constructed earliest from 2019 on. http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Fennovoima-sees-delay-in-licensing-of-Hanhikivi-1-1809175.html So let’s see if it delivers any power before 2030. And lets see if in 2030 someody will remember what nuclear power was about.
Looks like PV will install more than 100 GW this year. And the books of the machnine manufactorers are full with orders for new and improved production lines.
onesecond says
I agree, the EU needs a nuclear industrial policy, namely how to safely scrap the remaining reactors and how to safely handle the nuclear waste for the milennia to come. For energy production there are far better and cheaper options available today.
Bob Wallace says
Can Claude Fischer Herzog and his organization not do math?
France has stated that paid off reactors are too expensive to operate. The cost of new nuclear is astronomical.
The cost of renewable energy and storage continues to fall.
You don’t even need to know how to do algebra in order to calculate that nuclear is a dead duck. (Outside of countries with very low labor costs or very thick-headed central governments.)