The risk of terrorists obtaining nuclear material to make a dirty bomb, or hijacking a nuclear plant, is real, observes Allison Macfarlane, a Professor at George Washington University and former Chair of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. According to Macfarlane, countries with nuclear plants need to improve security quickly before it’s too late. They can learn from the United States, whose nuclear power plants are among the most well-guarded facilities in the world. Article courtesy of The Conversation.
In the wake of terrorist attacks in Brussels, Paris, Istanbul, Ankara and elsewhere, nations are rethinking many aspects of domestic security.
Nuclear plants, as experts have long known, are potential targets for terrorists, either for sabotage or efforts to steal nuclear materials.
Currently there are 444 nuclear power plants operating in 30 countriesaround the world and 243 smaller research reactors, which are used to produce isotopes for medical uses and to train nuclear engineers. The nuclear industry also includes hundreds of plants that enrich uranium and fabricate fuel for reactors. Some of these facilities contain materials terrorists could use to build a nuclear or “dirty” bomb. Alternatively, power plants could be “hijacked” to create an accident of the sort experienced at Chernobyl and Fukushima, sending clouds of radioactivity over hundreds of miles.
At last month’s Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., representatives from 52 countries pledged to continue improving their nuclear security and adopted action plans to work together and through international agencies.
Authorities investigating the Paris attacks discovered video surveillance footage of a Belgian nuclear official in the home of one of the Paris suspects
But significant countries like Russia and Pakistan are not participating. And many in Europe are just beginning to consider physical security measures. From my perspective as a former nuclear regulator and now as director of the Center for International Science and Technology Policy at George Washington University, it is clear that nuclear plants are vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
Physical and cyber threats
It is not news that security is weak at many civilian nuclear power and research facilities.
In October 2012, Greenpeace activists entered two nuclear power plants in Sweden by breaking open a gate and scaling fences without being stopped by guards. Four of them hid overnight on a roof at one reactor before surrendering the next morning.
Just this year, Sweden’s nuclear regulatory agency adopted a requirement for armed guards and additional security measures at the plants. However, these upgrades do not have to be in place until early 2017.
In 2014 French nuclear plants were plagued by unexplained drone overflights. And Greenpeace activists broke into the Fessenheim nuclear plant near the German border and hung a large banner from the reactor building.
In light of the recent Brussels attacks, reports from Belgium are more alarming. In 2012 two employees at the country’s Doel nuclear power station left Belgium to fight in Syria. In 2014 an unidentified saboteur tampered with lubricant in the turbine at the same reactor, causing the plant to shut down for five months. And earlier this year authorities investigating the Paris attacks discovered video surveillance footage of a Belgian nuclear official in the home of one of the Paris suspects.
Up to one-third of the workforce at many U.S. nuclear plants now is security-related
One has to assume that potential attackers may understand how the sites and materials can be used.
Given the heightened state of alert in Europe, governments should, I believe, immediately increase security at civilian nuclear facilities. They could emulate the United States, where security at nuclear facilities has substantially increased since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
American role model
U.S. nuclear power plants now are some of the most well-guarded facilities in the world.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates both safety and security at nuclear power plants. After 9/11, these sites were required to add multiple layers of protection, with the cores of reactors (where the fuel is located) the most highly defended areas.
Up to one-third of the workforce at many U.S. nuclear plants now is security-related. Many nuclear utilities used to hire contract security forces; now guards at many of these plants are employed directly by plant owners and have opportunities to move to other jobs at their sites, increasing employee satisfaction and improving performance.
Governments must take security at nuclear sites seriously now, not a year from now
NRC regulations require U.S. nuclear plants to hold regular drills in which well-trained former military units attack the plants with up-to-date materials and techniques. NRC observers evaluate these exercises, and facility owners face stiff penalties for failure.
The United States has also adopted regulations to ensure cybersecurity at reactors. As new, entirely digital reactors come online, such measures will be more necessary than ever.
The successful 2010 Stuxnet attack, for example, in which a computer worm infiltrated computers at Iranian nuclear facilities and caused machines to malfunction, showed how vulnerable unprotected computer networks can be.
Improving security worldwide
There are no global standards for physical protection at civilian nuclear facilities. Each country adopts its own laws and regulations dictating what nuclear site owners are required to do to protect plants from attack.
As a result, measures at plants can vary widely, with some countries depending on the local police force for protection and leaving guards unarmed. Often the level of security depends on cultural norms and attitudes, but the recent attacks in Europe suggest a rapid adjustment is needed.
Security forces at nuclear facilities should be required to practice attack scenarios regularly under the gaze of independent observers
Here are steps that, in my view, all countries can take to make nuclear plants more secure.
One priority is to provide enough funds to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has recently elevated its physical security section to assist member countries looking for ways to protect their nuclear plants more effectively. Since 2010 the agency has trained more than 10,000 people in nuclear security, including police and border guards. It also tracks illicit trafficking and other activities involving nuclear material, and has recorded nearly 3,000 such events since 1995.
Countries that have nuclear power plants or research reactors understandably tend not to spotlight the challenges of protecting these sites. But we know from instances like the ones cited above that they exist. In many countries nuclear regulatory agencies oversee safety but not security. Each of these nations needs to empower an independent regulator to enforce new requirements and inspect security at nuclear sites. Most importantly, security forces at nuclear facilities should be required to practice attack scenarios regularly under the gaze of independent observers.
In December 2012 the U.S. organized the first-ever International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security. No other government has offered to head up a follow-on meeting since then
Countries such as the United States that already have solid physical security requirements for nuclear facilities can help.
Nuclear regulators from all countries meet regularly and could easily share information and train their counterparts on plant physical security. In December 2012, for example, the U.S. NRC organized the first-ever International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security. No other government has offered to head up a follow-on meeting since then.
And countries with existing reactors aren’t the only problem. At least 60 countries have expressed a desire to acquire nuclear power. The United Arab Emirates is in the process of constructing four reactors. Turkey and Vietnam have made deals with the Russian manufacturer, Rosatom, in which construction, financing, operation, even waste disposal, will be handled solely by the Russians. Many of these “emergent” countries do not regularly attend Convention on Nuclear Safety peer review meetings at the International Atomic Energy Agency. Without a security regime in place, how can we expect them to do any better than the existing plants?
To prevent an attack at a nuclear site, governments must take security at nuclear sites seriously now, not a year from now.
In light of the current terrorist threat and with four Nuclear Security Summits completed, countries with nuclear plants need to up their game with regards to physical security at nuclear power facilities before it’s too late.
Editor’s Note
Allison Macfarlane is Professor of Science and Technology Policy at George Washington University and Director of the Center for International Science and Technology Policy at the University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. She recently served as Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission from July, 2012 until December, 2014. As Chairman, Dr. Macfarlane had ultimate responsibility for the safety of all U.S. commercial nuclear reactors, for the regulation of medical radiation and nuclear waste in the U.S., and for representing the U.S. in negotiations with international nuclear regulators.
This article was first published by The Conversation and is republished here with permission from the author and publisher.
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Mike Parr says
Many of the suggestions and points in the article make good sense. Although this comment fell into the category of truly bizarre ” with the cores of reactors (where the fuel is located) the most highly defended areas”. What? they have gun emplacements around the reactor core?
The book “Good Omens” is hilarious & relevant to “guarding reactor cores”. The end of the chapter titled “Thursday” (page 153) opens the action in this respect, and page 168 (Friday) closes it.
Yes, I can see how guarding highly radioactive reactor cores makes sense – after all, somebody nicking the elements would have a life measured in what? hours? days? You would certainly need a big team, if only because close proximity to “fresh” (& thus highly radioactive) fuel elements would mean they would sadly die quite quickly. Maybe the terrorists have thought of this & would turn up with robots and remote controlled gear & BNC suits and……about as likely as Dodgy Dave the UK PM doing something about corporate tax dodging in the UK.
Of course, with renewables one does not need to worry – one would need an army of swivel eyed jihadis to make even a minor impact. Another point to consider in the on-going renewables vs nuclear saga?.
Bas Gresnigt says
Never thought about armor penetrating rocket?
Somewhere in the nineties someone fired an old relative harmless one (from WWII) at French Super-Phenix (not operational yet).
You may assume that next terrorists will use more up-to-date & heavier rockets.
Robert Hargraves says
Terrorists attacking and overcoming security at a US LWR nuclear power plant can certainly not steal weapons-usable material. The risks are the same as at Fukushima — disabling the cooling that removes decay heat from fuel rods in the reactor vessel or cooling pools.
Modern nuclear power technologies such as high temperature gas cooled pebble bed reactors or molten salt reactors can survive such casualties with little or no release of radioactive materials to the environment. The ThorCon MSR design achieves passive safety through physical principles; there are not operator-adjustable controls that could lead to tragedies should terrorists take control.
Rather than hiring more militant guards for old LWRs we should accelerate the deployment of new, safer nuclear technology.
Bas Gresnigt says
A Fukushima like accident at Indian Point with the wrong wind will evacuate New York city.
So to reach a more safe situation we should close all present NPP’s and start developing MSR & gas cooled pebble bed reactors asap.
That may take substantial time and money as shown by the Chinese MSR project where ~600 scientists work to develop MSR since 2011: https://goo.gl/xJ3cM1
While they got all info from the scientists of ORNL, which they visited, their first 2MWth trial, planned for 2015, is delayed.
Their earliest date for a good commercial MSR is now ~2035.
James E. Hopf says
What we really learned from Fukushima is how *few* casualties result, even from the full meltdown of 3 large reactors. Consensus is that few if any deaths will eventually result (with any public health impacts being far too small to measure). The economic costs were significant, but are mostly due to unjustified over-reactions.
Given this, terrorists would cause far more deaths simply attacking a typical high school (with machine guns). Guaranteed success (as security is non-existent) and a *larger* consequence. History shows this, i.e., that they know to attack such softer targets.
The (long) list of other targets that will cause a *greater* loss of life than a meltdown if successfully attacked include oil refineries, LNG terminals, dams, chemical plants, tall buildings and any other place where large numbers of people gather (e.g., schools, sporting events, etc..). And none of these places/facilities are required to have anywhere near the level of security that nuclear plants are required to have.
Ever-escalating operational costs are starting to cause the closure of nuclear plants, and their replacement with fossil generation (that is orders of magnitude more risky and harmful to public health and the environment). And I’m hearing that security costs are one of the main drivers. In other words, those security requirements are actually *increasing* public health risks, as the risks associated with increased fossil fuel use far outweigh any risks associated with “inadequate” nuclear plant security.
This is a classic example of the double standards that are applied against all things nuclear. The industry should demand an end to the double standard. They should demand that either all those other facilities (including all the nations’ schools) have an equal level of security, or have nuclear’s securities requirements/costs be reduced by a factor of several.
Karel Beckman says
Interesting comment. Here we have a former Chair of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission apparently applying “double standards”. Supporters of nuclear power don’t seem to realize that nuclear power is NOT an “ordinary” form of energy. It carries extraordinary risks. Do you realize what impact a terrorist nuclear bomb would have? No oil refinery can compare to that. Clearly the suggestion to protect non-nuclear facilities in the same way as nuclear facilities would be prohibitive in terms of cost, so to avoid a double standard I assume we need to relax security at nuclear facilities? That’s simply unreal. Perhaps an argument could be made to socialize the costs of protecting nuclear facilities – if we decide that our society cannot live without nuclear power. But many countries have no problems doing without …
Frank says
Some opponents of nuclear power do not seem to know, or do not want to realise, that the difference between reactor fuel and bomb material is infinitely greater than the difference between petrol and napalm.
You can make napalm in your kitchen but you would need a nations effort to turn rector grade material into bomb grade.
Used reactor fuel would make it rather more difficult not easier.
True, most countries make do without nuclear energy. Some are blessed by nature with abundant hydro possibilities, some are heavy carbon emitters, some import most of their electricity from heavy carbon emitters, and a lot of them are 3rd world with an atrociously low standard of living and no industries.
Bas Gresnigt says
You don’t have to make a bomb.
It’s enough to grind radio-active material into dust, etc.
Then spread it around in e.g. Manhattan, etc. using cars, drones, plane, etc.
It will deliver big evacuations, etc.
Frank says
Natural Uranium is pretty harmless, and so is new reactor fuel. Transporting and processing spent fuel would likely kill one before he would be able to execute his plans.
Anyone can think of a 100 ways a terrorist could spread real mayhem and disaster.
Bas Gresnigt says
Well, the terror attacks in Paris, etc. show these people have exceptional (suicidal) courage.
They may use some protective shields, etc.
And they may dilute it so the radio-activity will become less, but still high enough to create a long evacuation etc.
E.g. they can mix the radio-active dust with some adhesive fluid (so the spray is difficult to remove) which they spray above e.g. Manhattan, and/or
mix the dust with your napalm, etc.
Bas Gresnigt says
They can also take older waste / spent fuel, as that is less radio-active.
Of course this implies more insight knowledge. But remember that at least two former employees of Belgian NPP’s went to Syria…
It implies that nuclear waste has to be strongly guarded during many decades after the closure of the NPP.
So expensive facilities such as that at Gorleben with a protective staff are needed. Preferable with a better storage building to protect the public against its radiation.
Yesterday German government reached preliminary agreement that the utilities will pay €23billion for the storage of their nuclear waste / spent fuel (utilities arrange and pay for the decommissioning themselves).
James E. Hopf says
Hospitals will always be an infinitely better source for dirty bomb materials. More concentrated sources that are of small (portable) size. With security being relatively non-existent. There is no radioactive material present at nuclear plants (including spent fuel pellets) that would be as good a dirty bomb material as those used in medicine and industry.
Of course, dirty bombs are a joke anyway; a purely psychological weapon from which all the deaths come from the explosion itself.
KM says
I don’t know if you are US-based or not, but the NRC chairman is a purely (agenda-based) political position. There have been many anti-nuclear people holding the role over the years which is terrible for many reasons. Like Jaczko before her, she was not qualified to lead the NRC. Neither one of them had the intention of making nuclear better or safer. I would put her nuclear opinion on the same level as the Union of Concerned Scientists. Neither one of them have any idea what they are talking about.
Bas Gresnigt says
Before Fukushima, Japan had a pro-nuclear “NRC”.
That declared (WEB-site) that Japanese NPP’s were special constructed so they could withstand major earth quakes & tsunami’s.
Even after the relative small (~6.6) earthquake in 2007, which caused radio-active leakage and so much damage that it took ~2 years to repair the Kashiwazaki NPP.
While that NPP was not above the fault line (center) of the quake, another NPP (Hamaoka) is right above the expected epicenter of a possible next quake.
Despite warnings from quake experts, it was allowed to continue until the Fukushima disaster.
It shows that a pro-nuclear NRC deliver increased chance of accidents as it will be less strict regarding measures, surveillance, etc.
Japanese government replaced their ‘NRC’!
KM says
This isn’t really true. Japan essentially had no regulating body for its nuclear plants. There was no NRC equivalent in Japan which is why one was created after the accident. Utilities reported directly to a non-regulating body. This led to two obvious mistakes that the US NRC would not license a plant under. The seawall in the original plant design was negotiated (kickbacks) to be nearly half the height that it was supposed to be. The plant designer threw a fit over this back during construction. Turns out the original seawall height would have been enough to stop the waves just barely. The other obvious flaw was emergency diesels in a non-watertight basement. I have been to many US plants and they are all in watertight above ground structures exactly for this reason. I realize you are anti-nuclear, but there are several reasons why fukushima happened and why it performed amazingly well. The earthquake was far beyond design-basis for the plant and it survived it with no problems (offsite transmission lines collapsed however). If it wasn’t for Japan not having an NRC equivalent we wouldn’t even know Fukushima’s name. A pro-Nuclear NRC is better for safety and regulation because it knows it has to protect the industry against the industry turmoil that would happen if they let a Fukushima happen.
Bas Gresnigt says
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), to which utilities reported, was also the regulatory body for nuclear power in Japan. Responsible to regulate (safety of) NPP’s
The AEC together with Tepco, are the main responsible,/a> for the Fukushima disaster.
Onagawa NPP survived primarily thanks to Hirai. He contributed heavily to the decision to increase the seawall from the proposed 4meter towards 14m. Just high enough to stop the 13m tsunami.
The Fukushima seawall was 10m.
Couldn’t find a link confirming your story that that seawall was negotiated to be nearly half the height than supposed to be??
Seems unlikely considering the 14m at Onagawa and the story behind it.
KM says
NISA was not regulatory in the same sense as the NRC and was far more comparable to the US’s AEC. Hence why the NRA was created after the disaster. I can’t find the original engineer biography where the seawall height was discussed (it was years ago), but wiki does mention that the seawall was known by TEPCO to be of insufficient height and that they tore down the original seawall that was 3X the height of the manmade one that replaced it. A plant in the US could not legally run if something from its original license was not met while in Japan it happened.
James E. Hopf says
A “pro-nuclear” NRC saves far more lives than it takes, as it results in the use of more nuclear and less fossil fuels (which in turn saves far more lives than meltdowns will ever cost). The numbers are clear on this.
The fossil fuels that Japan has (indefensibly) used in place of nuclear over just the last five years has caused thousands of Japanese deaths (as well as greatly increasing CO2 emissions and inflicting a massive economic cost). That’s FAR more deaths than the Fukushima meltdowns themselves cost (credible estimates for that range from 0-100).
Frank says
I fully agree.
Bas Gresnigt says
To illustrate the critical importance of a non pro-nuclear NRC:
Being more near the epicenter Onagawa NPP got an higher tsunami than Fukushima.
This story shows what happened and the non-role of Japanese “NRC” regarding safety.
An active NRC, lead by a slightly anti-nuclear chairman, would have demanded similar safety measures as Onagawa NPP, to be implemented at all other NPP’s along the coast. So also at Fukushima.
Then the Fukushima 2011 disaster, which hampers nuclear development in the whole world, probably would have been prevented.
James E. Hopf says
Relaxing nuclear security requirements (and expenses) is precisely what I’m suggesting. Why is that “unreal”. You realize that all I’m talking about is having the same level of security that they did for decades (in the US), before 9/11?
Then you go off and discuss bombs. What does that have to do with nuclear weapons? Commercial nuclear power plants have no materials that could be used to make a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, all other methods for obtaining weapons materials would be a far easier approach. Nuclear non-proliferation experts to not consider US nuclear plants to be a proliferation risk of any kind.
Nuclear carries “extraordinary risks”. How?? What Fukushima showed is that, if anything, the risks are extraordinarily *small*. Fukushima was the only significant release of pollution in non-Soviet nuclear’s entire 50 year history. And yet, expert consensus is that even that event (the full meltdown of 3 large reactors) caused no deaths and will never have any measurable public health impact. For comparison, over that same 50 year period, fossil power generation is estimated to have cause on the order of 10 million deaths, along with global warming.
Bas Gresnigt says
“expert consensus … meltdown … caused no deaths”
Even WHO experts concluded that the disaster will create a cancer increase of up to 7% in Fukushima children.
Despite:
– the speedy evacuation; and
– the wind which blew >99% of the radio-active material direct towards the ocean.
KM says
Expected cancers from nuclear accidents (unless onsite) are pretty much all directly related to radioactive iodine which has a half-life of only 8 days. Thyroid cancer also has a 98% cure rate, but the thyroid cancer rate has remained the same in Fukushima prefecture. Any slight uptick is attributed to the sheer amount of people getting screened that would not normally get screened.
Bas Gresnigt says
The WHO experts estimated cancers later in life, not just thyroid cancers. Read their report.